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2.1    Introduction
China’s rise as a trading power has taken the world by storm. Its exports 
have risen from 18 billion dollars or less than 4 percent of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 1980 to more than 760 billion dollars or about 35 per-
cent of its GDP by 2005. Besides the rapid expansion of its trade volume, 
researchers have noted another feature: China’s level of sophistication has 
been rising steadily. This sophistication can be seen in three aspects, two 
noted in the literature, and the third presented here, by us. First, as Schott 
(2006) noted, China’s export structure increasingly resembles the collective 
export structure of the high-  income countries in a way that seems unusual 
given China’s endowment and level of development. Second, as Rodrik 
(2006) observed, the level of GDP per capita associated with countries 
exporting the same basket of goods as China is much higher than China’s 
actual level of income per capita. Third, as we will show, the fraction of 
product lines that the United States, the ﬁ  fteen-  member European Union, 
and Japan (referred to hereafter as G3) export and that China does not is 
shrinking steadily. Obviously, these three trends are not independent from 
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Everyone knew that we would lose jobs in labor-  intensive indus-
tries like textiles and apparel, but we thought we could hold our 
own in the capital-  intensive, high-  tech arena. The numbers we’re 
seeing now put the lie to that hope—as China expands its share 
even in core industries such as autos and aerospace.
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1. This is computed at national level using equation (2) and excluding the region subscript.
2. There is virtually no product that China exports but G3 does not.
3. Xu (2007) noted that for the same product, the unit value of China’s exports tends to be 
lower than that of rich countries, indicating that China’s varieties are of lower quality and pre-
each other. Taken at their face value, they may suggest that China is com-
peting head to head with producers from developed and developing nations 
alike. This has generated a tremendous amount of anxiety in many nations. 
Why would China, a country with an extreme abundance of labor but rela-
tive scarcity in capital, skilled labor, and research and development (R&D) 
investment, produce and export a bundle of goods that resembles those 
of developed countries? Schott (2006) conjectures that this results from a 
combination of a large variation in factor endowment and a low factor 
mobility across regions.
The evolution of China’s export sophistication during 1996 to 2005 is 
traced out in table 2.1. This table shows that the level of dissimilarity between 
China’s export structure and that of the G3 economies declined from 133.7 
in 1996   to 121.5 by 2005.1 During the same period, the number of Harmo-
nized System (HS) six-  digit product lines exported by G3 countries but not 
by China fell from 101 in 1996 to 83 in 2005, out of 4,143 and 4,212 in total, 
respectively. As a share of the product lines that the G3 export, those not 
manufactured by China fell from 2.44 percent of the total in 1996 to 1.97 
percent in 2005. This count is somewhat misleading as China exports a very 
small volume (i.e., less than $1 million) in several product lines. Excluding 
these lines, the share of products exported by the G3 but not by China fell 
from 28.7 percent (1,189/4,143) in 1996 to 13.7 percent (578/4,212) in 2005.2
How much should developed countries be concerned with rising competi-
tive pressure from increasingly sophisticated Chinese exports? The answer 
depends on the sources of China’s rising sophistication. On the one hand, 
this sophistication, as measured, could be a statistical mirage due to pro-
cessing trade. For example, both the United States and China may export 
notebook computers, but Chinese manufacturers may have to import the 
computer’s most sophisticated components, such as central processing units 
(CPUs) made by Intel or AMD in the United States. In such a case, Chi-
nese producers may specialize in the unsophisticated stage of production 
although the ﬁ  nal product is classiﬁ  ed as sophisticated. If one were able to 
classify a product further into its components, China and developed coun-
tries might be found to produce diﬀerent components. That is, they do not 
compete directly with each other. In this scenario, there is very little for the 
developed countries to worry about.
As a variation of this scenario, China and the high-  income economies 
may export the same set of product lines, but they may export very diﬀerent 
varieties within each product line, with China exporting varieties of much 
lower quality.3 Competition between the high- income economies and China 
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sumably of lesser sophistication. Fontagne, Gaulier, and Zignago (2007, tables 1 and 2) show 
that China’s export structure, deﬁ  ned the same way as in Schott (2006) but at the HS six-  digit 
level, is more similar to Japan, the United States, and the European Union than to those of 
Brazil and Russia. However, judged on unit values, Chinese exports are more likely to be in the 
low end of the market than are those of the high-  income countries.
On the other hand, the Chinese authorities, including governments at the 
regional or local levels, have been actively promoting quality upgrades to 
China’s product structure through tax and other policy incentives. A par-
ticular manifestation of these incentives is the proliferation of economic and 
technological development zones, high- tech industrial zones, and export pro-
cessing zones around the country. Their collective share in China’s exports 
rose from less than 6 percent in 1995 to about 25 percent by 2005. These 
policy incentives could increase the similarity of Chinese exports to those of 
developed countries, though they are unlikely to be eﬃcient (unless learning 
by doing confers a signiﬁ  cant positive externality). If policy is the primary 
driver for rising sophistication (rather than the mismeasurement induced by 
processing trade), then China may come into more direct competition with 
developed countries.
Foreign- invested ﬁ  rms in China straddle these two explanations. The share 
of China’s total exports produced by wholly foreign- owned ﬁ  rms and Sino-
Table 2.1  Increasing overlaps in the export structure: China relative to the United 
States, the European Union, and Japan (1996–2005)
No. of HS six- 
digit product 
lines exported by 
the high-  income 
countries (G3, at 
least U.S. $1 
million)
Also exported by 
China (at least 
U.S. $1 million)
Fraction of the 
product lines 
exported by the 





Year (1) (2) (3)   1 – (2)/(1) (4)
1996 4,126 2,942 28.7 133.7
1997 4,123 3,042 26.2 132.5
1998 4,121 3,041 26.2 130.8
1999 4,120 3,024 26.6 129.2
2000 4,116 3,172 22.9 125.5
2001 4,118 3,184 22.7 124.8
2002 4,184 3,306 21.0 125.4
2003 4,182 3,408 18.5 126.1
2004 4,186 3,515 16.0 123.1
2005 4,179 3,609 13.6 121.5
Source: Authors’ computation based on trade statistics from the China Customs Administra-
tion and on G3 data downloaded from the UN COMTRADE database.
Note: The export dissimilarity index is computed based on equation (2), explained in the text; 
smaller values indicate greater overlaps. HS   Harmonized System.66        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
  foreign joint ventures has risen steadily over time, from about 31 percent 
in 1995 to more than 58 percent by 2005 (table 2.2). These foreign-  invested 
ﬁ  rms may choose to produce and export much more sophisticated products 
than would indigenous Chinese ﬁ  rms. In this scenario, while China-  made 
products may compete with those from developed countries, the proﬁ  ts from 
such activities contribute directly to the gross national products (GNPs) of 
developed countries. Besides the direct eﬀect of foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms on 
China’s export upgrading, the presence of foreign ﬁ  rms may help indirectly 
to raise the sophistication of Chinese exports through various spillovers to 
domestic ﬁ  rms (Hale and Long 2006). The preceding three possible expla-
nations can reinforce each other rather than be mutually exclusive. For ex-
ample, a foreign- invested ﬁ  rm may engage in processing trade while located 
in a high-  tech zone.
To the best of our knowledge, direct evidence on the importance of these 
channels is not yet available in the literature until recently. Using a detailed 
product- level data set on Chinese exports, the chapter by Amiti and Freund 
(chapter 1 in this volume) examines the change in the skill content of the 
Chinese exports. They have found a dramatic transformation of the export 
structure since 1992. In particular, there has been a signiﬁ  cant decline in the 
share of agriculture and traditional labor- intensive manufacturing products, 
such as textiles, garments, and shoes, with a growing share in nontradi-
tional manufactures, such as consumer electronics, appliances, computers, 
and telecommunication equipment. This would seem to suggest a dramatic 
rise in the skill content of China’s exports. They conﬁ  rm this by measuring 
the skill content in a sector as the ratio of nonproduction workers to total 





foreign- owned Collective Private
1995 66.7 19.8 11.7 1.5  0.0
1996 57.0 24.9 15.7 2.0  0.0
1997 56.2 23.9 17.1 2.5  0.0
1998 52.6 24.1 20.0 2.9  0.1
1999 50.5 23.2 22.2 3.5  0.3
2000 46.7 24.2 23.8 4.2  1.0
2001 42.6 24.1 25.9 5.3  2.0
2002 37.7 22.7 29.5 5.8  4.2
2003 31.5 21.5 33.3 5.7  7.9
2004 25.9 21.0 36.1 5.4 11.7
2005 22.2 19.9 38.4 4.8 14.7
2006 19.7 18.7 39.5 4.2 17.8
Average 
 1996–2004 39.8 22.7 27.8 4.7  4.9
Source: Authors’ computation based on oﬃcial trade statistics from the China Custom Administration.What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    6 7
employment from the Indonesian manufacturing census at the ﬁ  ve-  digit 
International Standard Industrial Classiﬁ  cation (ISIC) level for 1992 (they 
don’t have access to comparable data for China). However, a prominent 
feature of the Chinese exports is the role of processing trade—the use of 
tariﬀ-  free imported inputs in the production for exports—accounting for 
more than half of China’s total exports in recent years. It is possible the 
real skill content in processing exports is low even though they may appear 
in sectors that otherwise would be classiﬁ  ed as having a high-  skill content. 
Outside processing exports, they ﬁ  nd very little skill upgrading associated 
with normal exports. They note, however, that they cannot rule out the possi-
bility that within processing exports, “the Chinese value added has become 
more skill-  intensive.”
In this chapter, we measure China’s evolving export sophistication, not by 
the changing share of nonproduction workers in employment, but, follow-
ing Schott (2006), by an increase in the resemblance of its export bundle to 
those of high-  income countries. Our data set is even more ﬁ  nely disaggre-
gated than what is used in Amiti and Freund (chapter 1 in this volume): our 
product- level data set on Chinese exports is disaggregated by ﬁ  rm ownership 
type and incentive status of a production location in about 240 Chinese 
cities.
Our data set allows us to examine some questions that are not possible 
to examine in the previous chapter. For example, we can assess respective 
contributions by processing exports in a high-  tech incentive zone, normal 
exports in a similar zone, and processing exports outside the incentive zones 
to China’s export structure sophistication. This allows us to also reach some-
what diﬀerent conclusions.
To preview some of our key ﬁ  ndings, we will argue that it is important to 
look both at export structure and at the unit value of exports. We will report 
evidence that neither processing trade nor foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms play an 
important role in generating the increased overlap between China’s export 
structure and that of the high-  income countries. Instead, improvement in 
human capital and government policies in the form of tax-  favored high-
  tech zones appear to contribute signiﬁ  cantly to the rising sophistication of 
China’s exports.
Our ﬁ  nding on the role of processing trade in raising export sophistica-
tion appears to be diﬀerent from the previous chapter in part due to the 
diﬀerence in the data sets (and in part due to the diﬀerence in the metric 
used to assess sophistication). Our more ﬁ  nely disaggregated data shows 
that the contributions to export structure sophistication from processing 
and normal exports in a high-  tech incentive zone are about the same, and 
those from processing and normal exports outside any incentive zones are 
also about the same. This leads us to conclude that it is the incentive zones, 
not processing trade, that are associated with a more sophisticated export 
structure. Because processing exports are disproportionately located in vari-68        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
ous incentive zones, one may not be able to isolate the eﬀect of processing 
exports without the more disaggregated data.
An analysis of unit values adds important insights. Processing trade is 
positively associated with higher unit values. In the absence of data on value 
added from imported inputs versus domestic inputs, it is diﬃcult to say 
whether processing trade has generated any skill upgrading for China. How-
ever, after controlling for processing trade, exports by foreign- invested ﬁ  rms 
tend to have systematically higher unit values, suggesting that they produce 
higher- end product varieties (beyond promoting processing exports). High-
 tech zones and other policy zones set up by the government are likewise asso-
ciated with higher unit values (beyond promoting processing trade). There-
fore, both foreign investment and government policy zones are conducive to 
greater product sophistication, by increasing the overlap in China’s export 
structure with that of the advanced economies or by producing higher-  end 
varieties within a given product category.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 2.2 explains the 
basic speciﬁ  cation and the underlying data, section 2.3 reports a series of 
statistical analyses, and section 2.4 concludes.
2.2    Speciﬁ  cation and Data
Our strategy is to make use of variations across Chinese cities in both 
export sophistication and its potential determinants to study their relation-
ship. We look at two measures of export sophistication: (a) the similarity 
between local export structure to that of the G3 economies, and (b) the 
unit value of local exports. We consider several categories of determinants, 
including the level of human capital, the use of processing trade, and the 
promotion of sophistication by governments through high-  tech and eco-
nomic development zones.
2.2.1      Data and Basic Facts
Data on China’s exports were obtained from the China Customs General 
Administration at the HS eight-  digit level (the most disaggregated level of 
classiﬁ  cation available). The administration’s database reports the geo-
graphic origin of exports (from more than 400 cities in China), policy zone 
designation (i.e., whether an exporter is located in any type of policy zone), 
ﬁ  rm ownership, and transaction type (whether an export is related to pro-
cessing trade, as determined by customs declarations) for the period from 
1995 through 2005.
We link this database with a separate database on Chinese cities, including 
gross metropolitan product (GMP) per capita, population, college enrol-
ment, and foreign direct investment (FDI) data, downloaded from China 
Data Online (a site managed by the University of Michigan China Data What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    6 9
Center). Unfortunately, the coverage of this second database is more lim-
ited (240 cities from 1996 through 2004), which eﬀectively constrains the 
ultimate sample for the statistical analyses. Our sample of cities is listed in 
table 2A.3.
The exports by the G3 economies at the HS six-  digit level come from the 
United Nations’ COMTRADE database, downloaded from the World Inte-
grated Trade Solution (WITS). We wish to focus on manufactured goods, 
not on natural resources, and have, therefore, excluded the goods in HS 
chapters 1 to 27 (agricultural and mineral products) and raw materials and 
their simple transformations (mostly at HS four-  digit level) in other HS 
chapters. A list of excluded products is reported in table 2A.4.
Summary statistics are reported in tables 2.1 to 2.6. From table 2.1, we 
can see that the fraction of HS six-  digit product lines that the advanced 
economies export but China does not declined over time, from 28.7 percent 
in 1996 to 13.6 percent in 2005. This is consistent with the possibility of a 
rapid rise in export sophistication by China.
Table 2.2 reports a breakdown of export value by the ownership of export-
ers. A number of features are worth noting. First, the share of China’s 
exports produced by state-  owned ﬁ  rms declined steadily from 66.7 percent 
in 1995 to 39.8 percent in 2005. This reduction in the role of state-  owned 
ﬁ  rms in exports mirrors the reduced economic role of the state in general. 
Second, foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms (both wholly foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms and Sino-
  foreign joint ventures) play a signiﬁ  cant role in China’s exports. Their share 
of China’s exports also grew steadily from 31.5 percent in 1995 to 58.3 per-
cent in 2005. The role played by foreign ﬁ  rms in China’s export industries 
is greater than their role in most other countries with a population over ten 
million. Third, exports by truly private domestic ﬁ  rms are relatively small, 
though their share in China’s exports has similarly increased over time, 
from basically nothing before 1997 to 17.8 percent by 2005. Some growth in 
exports by domestic private ﬁ  rms is achieved by a change in ﬁ  rm ownership. 
For example, the laptop manufacturer Lenovo was established as a partly 
state- owned  ﬁ  rm. By 2003, it was a privately owned ﬁ  rm. By now, Lenovo 
has attracted foreign investment, acquired the original IBM PC division, 
and exported products under the IBM brand.
Table 2.3 reports a breakdown of China’s exports into processing trade, 
normal trade, and other categories according to exporters’ customs declara-
tions. Processing exports come from three areas: (a) export processing zones, 
(b) various high-  tech zones, and (c) areas outside any policy zones. Collec-
tively, their share of the country’s total exports increased from 43 percent 
(  0   3.2%   39.8%) in 1995 to 52 percent (  4.6%   11.8%   35.6%) in 
2005. As we lack information on the share of processing exports for other 
countries, we cannot conduct a formal international comparison. Our con-
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4. Fisman and Wei (2004) provide evidence of massive tariﬀ evasion on China’s imports. 
Fisman, Moustakerski, and Wei (2008) suggest that entrepôt trade via Hong Kong may have 
been used as a conduit for part of the tariﬀ evasion.
exports as large as China’s. On the other hand, we conjecture that China’s 
reported processing trade may be exaggerated due to some ﬁ  rms’ desire to 
evade tariﬀs on the domestic sale of imported “inputs.”4
Table 2.4 tabulates the distribution of ﬁ  rm ownership for exports from 
each type of policy zone. Foreign- invested ﬁ  rms are dominant in processing 
exports, accounting for 100 percent of exports out of export processing 
zones, 95 percent of processing exports out of high-  tech zones, and 67 
percent of processing exports from the rest of China. State-  owned ﬁ  rms 
account for the bulk of the remaining processing trade. Therefore, wholly 
and partly foreign- owned ﬁ  rms handle most processing exports. The reverse 
is not true—foreign ﬁ  rms also engage in normal (i.e., nonprocessing) exports, 
accounting in 2004 for 40 percent of nonprocessing exports out of high- tech 
zones and for 24 percent of normal trade outside policy zones.
We can compute a breakdown of export type (processing or nonproc-
essing) by ownership. The result is reported in table 2.6. For both wholly 
foreign- owned  ﬁ  rms and Sino-  foreign joint ventures, processing trade 
accounts for nearly 50 percent of exports. For state-  owned ﬁ  rms and col-
lectively owned ﬁ  rms, the share of processing exports in their total exports 
is 18 percent and 13 percent, respectively. Domestic private ﬁ  rms engage in 
comparatively little processing trade, making less than 7 percent of their 
exports in this category.
As part of its development strategy, China established a number of spe-
cial economic zones and other areas where special incentives were applied 
following 1979. Five special economic zones (SEZs) were set up and should 
be distinguished from other special economic areas. These include all of 
Hainan province, three cities in Guangdong province (Shenzhen, Zhuhai, 
and Shantou), and a city in Fujian Province (Xiamen). Other special eco-




GMP per capita (in log) 1981   8.97   8.89 0.63   7.23 11.48
GMP (in log) 1981 14.74 14.71 0.96 11.16 18.13
Student enrollment in colleges 
    and universities as a share of 
nonagricultural population 1986  0.016  0.009 0.019  0.000  0.155
























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All ﬁ  rms
  N 1,986 1,986 1,986 1,986 1,986
  Mean 5.24 0.259 0.0144 0.0068 0.0004
  Median 5.26 0.196 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.07 0.233 0.0594 0.0253 0.0057
  Min. 4.84 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 0.996 0.5940 0.4206 0.1534
State- owned  ﬁ  rms
  N 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981 1,981
  Mean 5.24 0.168 0.0016 0.0058 0.0000
  Median 5.27 0.103 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.06 0.200 0.0105 0.0327 0.0000
  Min. 4.92 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 0.990 0.1822 0.5102 0.0013
Joint- venture  ﬁ  rms
  N 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,835 1,835
  Mean 5.27 0.430 0.0263 0.0143 0.0004
  Median 5.28 0.418 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.04 0.321 0.0875 0.0663 0.0083
  Min. 4.95 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 1.000 0.6985 0.9543 0.3256
Wholly foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms
  N 1,552 1,552 1,552 1,552 1,552
  Mean 5.27 0.417 0.0448 0.0132 0.0019
  Median 5.29 0.378 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.04 0.355 0.1433 0.0481 0.0214
  Min. 4.99 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 1.000 0.9470 0.9898 0.5395
Collectively owned ﬁ  rms
  N 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640 1,640
  Mean 5.28 0.117 0.0021 0.0037 0.0010
  Median 5.29 0.001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.03 0.203 0.0218 0.0228 0.0216
  Min. 5.10 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 1.000 0.5497 0.3115 0.5919
Private ﬁ  rms
  N 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264 1,264
  Mean 5.27 0.055 0.0025 0.0143 0.0000
  Median 5.29 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  SD 0.04 0.141 0.0378 0.0692 0.0002
  Min. 4.96 0.000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
  Max. 5.30 1.000 1.0000 1.0000 0.0051
Note: SD   standard deviation.74        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
nomic areas are much smaller geographically and are classiﬁ  ed as economic 
and technological development areas (ETDAs), hi-  technology industry de-
velopment areas (HTIDA), and export processing zones (EPZs). Some of 
these special incentive zones and areas are located within the ﬁ  ve SEZs. We 
will also refer to these incentive zones or areas as “policy zones.”
The ETDAs and HTIDAs are tax- favored enclaves established by central 
or local governments (with approval by the central government) to pro-
mote development of sectors designated as “high and new tech,” albeit by 
somewhat poorly deﬁ  ned criteria. In theory, there are diﬀerences between 
the two types of zones. In practice, however, the line between the two is 
often blurred. The determination of what ﬁ  rms should go into a particular 
type of zone is somewhat arbitrary; therefore, we group them together in 
our subsequent discussions. With progressively more ETDAs and HTIDAs 
being established, their share in China’s exports has grown steadily in our 
sample, from only 4.3 percent in 1995 to 15.4 percent in 2005 (sum of col-
umns [3] and [4] in table 2.3). Because most cities do not yet have such zones, 
an unweighted average of their share in a city’s exports, across all cities and 
years, comes to only 2 percent (sum of columns [3] and [4] in the top panel 
of table 2.6).
Dedicated EPZs (which exclusively export processing trade) were ﬁ  rst 
established in 2001 and are present in only twenty-  six cities today. By 2005, 
only 3.5 percent of exports came from all the EPZs together (table 2.3). 
On simple average (across cities and years), only 0.04 percent of exports 
come from EPZs. This means that most of China’s processing exports are 
produced outside EPZs. It is useful to bear this in mind when interpreting 
the regression coeﬃcients in the subsequent tables.
Foreign- invested  ﬁ  rms dominate processing exports from EPZs and 
high-  tech zones (in our sample period, 99 percent and 95 percent respec-
tively—see table 2.4) and also took a lion’s share of processing trade (67 
percent) outside those policy zones. State-  owned ﬁ  rms are the major play-
ers in normal exports, accounting for 58 percent of normal exports from 
high-  tech zones and 63 percent of normal exports outside policy zones, 
during our sample period. Though they played a small role in processing 
trade, collectively owned and private ﬁ  rms produced an important share 
of China’s normal exports, accounting for 8.5 percent of normal exports 
from high-  tech zones and 18 percent of exports outside policy zones 
(table 2.4).
2.2.2    Basic  Speciﬁ  cation
We relate the sophistication level of local export structure to its plausible 
determinants, including the role of processing trade, foreign investment, and 
local human capital. Formally, the econometric speciﬁ  cation is given by the 
following equation (or by variations to be noted):What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    7 5
(1)  Ln(EDIrft)   city_ﬁ  xed   year_ﬁ  xed    1 EPZ_sharerft
   2 High_tech_zone_processing_Sharerft
   3 Processing_outside_anyzone_sharerft
   4 High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerft
   5 Ln(GMPrt)    6 SKILLrt   other_controls    rft,
where Ln(EDI) is the log of a dissimilarity index between a Chinese city’s 
export structure and the combined export structure of the United States, 
Japan, and the European Union.  1  2, . . . ,  6 are coeﬃcients to be esti-
mated.  rft is the error term. Other regressors and the sources of our data 
are explained in table 2A.1. Robust standard errors, clustered by city, are 
reported.
We deﬁ  ne an index for a lack of sophistication by the dissimilarity between 
the product structure of a region’s exports and that of the G3 economies, or 
the export dissimilarity index (EDI), as:
(2) EDIrft   100∑i abs(sirft   si,t
ref),




where sirft is the share of HS product i at six-  digit level in Chinese city r’s 
exports for ﬁ  rm type f in year t, and si,t
ref is the share of HS product i in the 
six-  digit level exports of G3 developed countries. The greater the value of 
the index, the more dissimilar the compared export structures are. If the two 
export structures were identical, then the value of the index would be zero; 
if the two export structures were to have no overlap, then the index would 
take the value of 200. We regard an export structure as more sophisticated 
if the index takes a smaller value. Alternatively, one could use the similarity 
index proposed by Finger and Kreinin (1979) and used by Schott (2006) 
(except for the scale):
(4) ESIrft   100∑imin(sirft, si,t
ref)
This index is bounded by zero and 100. If Chinese city r’s export structure 
had no overlap with that of the G3 developed countries, then the export simi-
larity index (ESI) would be zero; if the two export structures had a perfect 
overlap, then the index would take the value of 100. It can be veriﬁ  ed that 
there is a one-  to-  one, linear mapping between ESI and EDI:
(5) ESIrft   
200   EDIrft   
276        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
Table 2A.7 reports regressions that use ESI and EDI in levels, respectively, 
as the dependent variables. It can be seen that the coeﬃcient on any given 
regressor always has the opposite sign in each of the two speciﬁ  cations. These 
linear speciﬁ  cations have the drawback that the error term is far from being 
normally distributed. A better speciﬁ  cation would use logged EDI or logged 
ESI as the dependent variable. However, log(ESI) is related to log(EDI) only 
nonlinearly. Economic theory does not give much guidance to the exact 
functional form. Our experimentation suggests that using log(EDI) as the 
dependent variable is more likely to produce robustly signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients. 
Most important, the sign patterns on the coeﬃcient estimates are consistent 
between regressions using logged EDI and EDI, respectively, as the depen-
dent variables, but they are inconsistent between regressions using logged 
ESI and ESI as the left-  hand-  side variables. Therefore, in our analysis, we 
use log(EDI) as the dependent variable.
2.3    Analysis
2.3.1    Basic  Results
Our regression results are reported in table 2.7. In the ﬁ  rst four columns, 
the sophistication of a city’s export structure is measured on a year-  by-
  year basis by its similarity with that of the G3 high-  income countries. As 
a robustness check, in the last four columns, export sophistication is mea-
sured against the export structure of the high-  income countries in a ﬁ  xed 
year (2004, the last in our sample period). The change in reference year for 
export sophistication does not turn out to matter qualitatively.
The coeﬃcient on “export processing zone exports as a share of total city 
exports” is negative and signiﬁ  cant, implying that exports from EPZs tend 
to be more similar to those of the G3 high-  income countries than are typi-
cal Chinese exports. However, as a majority of Chinese cities do not have 
EPZs, this does not contribute much to explaining cross-  city diﬀerences in 
export sophistication.
The coeﬃcients on the two variables describing exports from high-  tech 
zones (“processing exports from high-  tech zones” and “nonprocessing 
exports from high-  tech zones”) are negative and signiﬁ  cant, implying that 
the high- tech zones do contribute to raising the sophistication of the Chinese 
export structure. Comparing the two point estimates, however, one sees that 
the nonprocessing exports from the two types of high- tech zones in fact con-
tribute more to raising export sophistication than do processing exports.
The coeﬃcient on processing exports outside any policy zones is posi-
tive and signiﬁ  cant: the more processing trade outside any policy zones, the 
less sophisticated a city’s exports are. Taking the discussion of the last four 
coeﬃcients together, we argue that processing trade (outside policy zones) is 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.78        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
to that of the high-  income countries. This argument is consistent with the 
intuition that processing trade in many areas of China, excepting policy 
zones, is relatively labor-  intensive.
The coeﬃcient on student enrollment in colleges or graduate schools 
as a share of a given city’s nonagricultural population—a proxy for that 
city’s level of human capital—is negative and signiﬁ  cant, consistent with 
the notion that a city with more skilled labor tends to have a more sophis-
ticated export structure. In column (2) of table 2.7, we use GMP per capita 
as an alternative measure of a city’s level of human capital. This variable 
also produces a negative coeﬃcient, indicating an association between more 
human capital and more sophisticated export structure.
In columns (3) to (4) of table 2.7, we include measures of the presence 
of foreign ﬁ  rms in a city. The estimated coeﬃcient for exports by wholly 
foreign- owned  ﬁ  rms as a share of a city’s total exports is not signiﬁ  cantly 
diﬀerent from zero. Interestingly, the share of exports by joint- venture ﬁ  rms 
has a positive coeﬃcient: the more a city’s exports come from joint-  venture 
ﬁ  rms, the less that city’s export structure resembles that of the high-  income 
countries. These results suggest that foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms in China are not 
directly responsible for the rising sophistication of China’s export structure, 
or at least not in a simple linear fashion.
As we explained earlier, columns (5) to (8) of table 2.7 replicate the ﬁ  rst 
four columns except that the left- hand- side variables are recalibrated against 
the export structure of the G3 economies in 2004. The qualitative results 
remain essentially the same. To summarize the key ﬁ  ndings that emerge from 
the series of regressions in table 2.7, we ﬁ  nd the following:
1. Cross-  city diﬀerences in human capital are linked to cross-  city 
diﬀerences in the level of sophistication of export structures. A higher level 
of human capital, measured either by GMP per capita or by college and 
graduate school enrollment, is associated with a more sophisticated export 
structure.
2.  High-  tech zones are associated with more sophisticated export struc-
tures. The higher the share of a city’s exports produced in high-  tech zones, 
the more likely that city’s export structure is to resemble that of the G3 
high- income  economies.
3. The EPZs contribute to rising sophistication in export structures. 
However, because only a small fraction of Chinese cities have EPZs, these 
play a very small quantitative role in explaining cross-  city diﬀerences in 
export- structure  sophistication.
4. Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining cross-
 city  diﬀerences in export-  structure sophistication. This can be seen in two 
ways. First, with regard to exports outside policy zones (which represent 
the lion’s share of all exports), more processing trade is in fact associated 
with less resemblance to the export structure of the high-  income countries. What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    7 9
Second, with regard to exports produced in high- tech zones, nonprocessing 
trade is more responsible for a resemblance to the export structure of the 
high-  income countries than processing trade.
5.  After controlling for exports from major policy zones, foreign invest-
ment appears not to play a major role in explaining cross-  city diﬀerences 
in the level of sophistication of their export structures. If anything, joint-
 venture  ﬁ  rms may create some divergence between a city’s export structure 
and that of the high-  income economies.
These ﬁ  ndings reject the view that China’s increasingly sophisticated 
export structure is the product of processing trade or foreign- invested ﬁ  rms. 
Meanwhile, these ﬁ  ndings conﬁ  rm the importance of human capital and 
government-  sponsored high-  tech zones in increasing the sophistication of 
China’s export structure.
The speciﬁ  cation used in table 2.7 includes city ﬁ  xed eﬀects, as is expected 
in panel regressions such as ours. However, to ensure that the variables we 
have proposed—processing trade, foreign ownership, high-  tech zones, 
human capital, and so on—collectively have suﬃcient explanatory power 
over observed cross- city export- structure dissimilarities, we have run similar 
regressions without city ﬁ  xed eﬀects (see table 2A.8). The signs on the 
coeﬃcient estimates and their statistical signiﬁ  cance are generally similar in 
table 2A.8 and in table 2.7. Equally important, the values of R- square in this 
second set of regressions lie in the range of 66 to 68 percent. This suggests 
that much of the cross-  city diﬀerences in export patterns are explained by 
the included regressors and not by city ﬁ  xed eﬀects.
2.3.2      Exports by Firms of Diﬀerent Ownership
Because China is still transitioning from a centrally planned system to a 
market-  based economy and has become very open to foreign direct invest-
ment (as the greatest developing-  country recipient of FDI since 1995), its 
exports are primarily generated by state-  owned ﬁ  rms and foreign-  invested 
ﬁ  rms rather than by domestic privately owned ﬁ  rms. State-  owned and 
foreign- invested  ﬁ  rms account for 40 percent and 51 percent of China’s 
total exports during our sample period, respectively (table 2.2). It will be 
beneﬁ  cial to examine the determinants of export-  structure sophistication 
by ﬁ  rm ownership type.
Table 2.8 reports a series of regressions with the left-  hand-  side variable 
being the export-  structure dissimilarity index for state-  owned ﬁ  rms (but 
otherwise identically speciﬁ  ed as those in table 2.7). The results shown in 
table 2.8 are qualitatively very similar to those in table 2.7. In particular, 
diﬀerences in the degree of processing trade (outside policy zones) are not 
shown to be responsible for cross- city diﬀerences in export- structure sophis-
tication. If anything, processing trade outside policy zones may have reduced 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.82        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
5. Hale and Long (2006) suggest that foreign ﬁ  rms in China generate technological spillover 
to local ﬁ  rms in part through the reemployment of skilled labor from foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms 
by local ﬁ  rms.
tries. More human capital, as measured by either GMP per capita or college 
student enrollment, is associated with an increased resemblance of state-
  owned-  enterprise export structures to that of the high-  income countries.
Columns (3) to (4) and (7) to (8) of table 2.8 can be interpreted as a test 
of possible spillover from foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms to local state-  owned enter-
prises in any given city.5 The coeﬃcients on the shares of wholly foreign-
 owned  ﬁ  rms or joint ventures in a city’s total exports are essentially zero, 
statistically. Therefore, the presence by foreign ﬁ  rms in the same industry and 
in the same city does not appear to aﬀect whether state-  owned-  enterprise 
exports resemble those of the high-  income countries.
Table 2.9  Wholly foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms’ export structure dissimilarity relative to the 
G3 countries
Yearly benchmarks 2004 benchmark
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Export processing zone exports as a
  share of total city exports
–0.095 –0.097∗ –0.112 –0.115
(0.059) (0.057) (0.073) (0.071)
Processing exports in high-  tech 
    zones as a share of total city 
exports
–0.017 –0.016 –0.024∗ –0.022
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014)
Nonprocessing exports in high-  tech 
    zones as a share of total city 
exports
–0.013 –0.013 –0.019 –0.019
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.014)
Processing exports outside 
    economic zones as a share of 
total city exports
–0.001 –0.001 –0.007 –0.007
(0.001) (0.001) (0.008) (0.008)
Student enrollment in institutions 
    of higher education as a share of 




Gross metropolitan product (GMP) –0.005∗ –0.003 –0.005 –0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
GMP per capita –0.012∗∗ –0.012∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
City ﬁ  xed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Robust (clustered by city) Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 1,548 1,548 1,548 1,548
R2 0.95 0.95 0.81 0.81
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    8 3
6. Xu and Lu (2007) report diﬀerences between ﬁ  rms from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan, 
and those from the United States and other Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) countries.
Tables 2.9 and 2.10 report similar regressions for wholly foreign-  owned 
and Sino-  foreign joint-  venture ﬁ  rms, respectively. In these tables, unlike in 
tables 2.7 and 2.8, no regressor except the proxies for human capital is sta-
tistically signiﬁ  cant. This reinforces our earlier conclusion that, during our 
sample period, foreign- invested ﬁ  rms did not contribute to the rising sophis-
tication of China’s export structure. Tables 2.9 and 2.10 suggest that this is 
true whether foreign ﬁ  rms are located in EPZs, high- tech zones, or elsewhere. 
Unfortunately, data limitations prevent us from examining whether FDI 
from diﬀerent source countries has diﬀerentially promoted the sophistica-
tion of China’s export structure.6
Table 2.10  Joint-  venture ﬁ  rms’ exports structure dissimilarity relative to the 
G3 countries
Yearly benchmark 2004 benchmark
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Export processing zone exports as a 
  share of total city exports
0.013 –0.002 0.000 –0.016
(0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.036)
Processing exports in high-  tech 
    zones as a share of total city 
exports
–0.005 –0.006 –0.014 –0.015∗
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Nonprocessing exports in high-  tech 
    zones as a share of total city 
exports
0.001 –0.000 0.001 0.001
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008)
Processing exports outside 
    economic zones as a share of 
total city exports
0.001 0.000 0.003∗ 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Student enrollment in institutions 
    of higher education as a share of 




Gross metropolitan product (GMP) –0.001 –0.001 –0.001 –0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
GMP per capita –0.004∗ –0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
City ﬁ  xed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Year ﬁ  xed eﬀects Y Y Y Y
Robust (clustered by city) Y Y Y Y
No. of observations 1,831 1,831 1,831 1,831
R2 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.96
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.
∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 10 percent level.84        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
For completeness, we also examine the dissimilarity index of export struc-
tures relative to the G3 economies for collectively and privately owned ﬁ  rms, 
respectively (see tables 2.11 and 2.12). For each type of ﬁ  rm, a higher level of 
local human capital is associated with the greater resemblance of its exports 
to those of the high-  income countries. For collectively owned ﬁ  rms alone, 
there is evidence that processing trade both within and without policy zones 
may have slowed the rise in the sophistication of these ﬁ  rms’ export struc-
tures. This is consistent with the possibility that most of these collectively 
owned ﬁ  rms operate in labor-  intensive industries.
For domestic private ﬁ  rms (but not for collectively owned ﬁ  rms), EPZs 
promote a similar export structure to that of the rich countries. However, 
EPZs do not exist in most cities. In contrast to the state-  owned enterprises, 
wholly foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms or joint ventures in the same city have some 
impact on private ﬁ  rms’ export-  structure sophistication; both coeﬃcients 
are negative (the coeﬃcient for wholly foreign-  owned ﬁ  rms is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant). This is evidence that the presence of foreign- invested ﬁ  rms may 
have helped Chinese private ﬁ  rms increase their export sophistication over 
the sample period.
2.3.3    Unit  Value
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of specialization across va-
rieties within a product (Schott 2004); we now look at cross-  city diﬀerences 
in the unit value of the same product, where a product is deﬁ  ned both by its 
HS eight- digit code and by its physical unit code. For example, HS 94053000 
refers to “lighting sets used for Christmas trees,” but there are two diﬀerent 
physical units used to measure the quantities of exports of this product: 
number of items and mass in kilograms. We take 94053000 (number of 
items) and 94503000 (kilograms) as two diﬀerent products in our estima-
tion.
Our assumption is that diﬀerent unit values for the same product reﬂ  ect 
diﬀerent varieties (and statistical noise). For example, both high-  end and 
low-  end digital cameras ﬁ  t into the same HS eight-  digit product classiﬁ  ca-
tion, but high- end cameras command a higher unit value. We note, however, 
that diﬀerences in unit value within an eight- digit product category may also 
reﬂ  ect factors other than quality, such as diﬀerences in production costs (see 
Hallack 2006; Hallack and Schott 2006). We will assume that these factors 
generate noise in the mapping of unit value against product variety.
We now investigate the roles of processing trade, high- tech zones, and ﬁ  rm 
ownership in explaining diﬀerences in unit value (which proxy for diﬀerences 
in variety) within a product category. To ﬁ  x intuition, let us look at two 
examples. As a ﬁ  rst example, color video monitors (HS code 852821) were 
produced and exported in 2005 by local and foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms located 
in EPZs and high-  tech zones and also outside policy zones. The average 
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7. This ﬁ  gure is taken from information in the UN COMTRADE database; we thank Mark 
Gehlhar for providing this data.
Even monitors produced entirely by foreign- invested ﬁ  rms in China showed 
variations in unit value dependent on where the producer was located and 
whether the export was of processing trade or normal trade. The unit value 
of monitors exported from an EPZ was $347.80; processing- export monitors 
from a high- tech zone were valued at $456.70, while normal- export monitors 
from the same zone were sold for $364.80; in distinction, processing-  export 
monitors from outside any policy zone were valued at only $56.80, and 
normal- trade monitors from outside any policy zone cost $73.60. Ownership 
also matters. The unit value of a monitor was $207.00 when it was exported 
by a state-  owned ﬁ  rm and only $77.20 when it was exported by a domestic 
private ﬁ  rm. For comparison, the average unit value of the same product, 
as exported by producers from the United States, the European Union, and 
Japan was $467.40.7 Generally speaking, the unit values of the Chinese 
exports are lower than those from high-  income countries. In this example, 
of the Chinese varieties, the processing-  export monitor produced by a for-
eign ﬁ  rm located in a high-  tech zone had the highest unit value, roughly 98 
percent of the value of G3 exports, suggesting that it may substitute closely 
for the high-  income countries’ variety.
As a second example, video cameras (HS code 852540) were also produced 
and exported by ﬁ  rms of various ownership, located in areas with diﬀerent 
policy incentives. The average unit value for video cameras exported by 
foreign- invested  ﬁ  rms was $51.50 in 2005, compared to $30.20 for a similar 
camera made by state- owned ﬁ  rms. Both export type and ﬁ  rm location mat-
ter as well. Of processing-  exports cameras produced by foreign-  invested 
ﬁ  rms, the unit value was $154.60 for exports from a high-  tech zone, $66.30 
for those from outside any policy zone, and $51.50 for those assembled in an 
export processing zone. For normal- export cameras made by a foreign ﬁ  rm, 
the unit value was $21.60 for those from a high-  tech zone, and only $13.20 
for those from outside any policy zone. Again, processing exports from a 
high- tech zone had the highest unit value, and normal exports not from any 
policy zone had the lowest value. Cameras produced by foreign-  invested 
ﬁ  rms generally had a higher unit value than did local ﬁ  rms. For comparison, 
the average unit value of a camera manufactured in the G3 countries (the 
United States, Japan, and the European Union) was $331.50. In this ex-
ample, even China’s priciest variety (a processing export made in a high- tech 
zone by a foreign ﬁ  rm) had a unit value only 47 percent that of the average 
G3-  exported camera. In this example, the variety of video camera made in 
China is unlikely to substitute closely for that of a wealthy country.
While these examples are illustrative, we must turn to a regression frame-
work to summarize patterns in the data more eﬃciently and systematically. What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    8 9
Additionally, our regression framework explicitly accounts for diﬀerences 
in income across regions, as well as other factors that could account for the 
diﬀerences in unit value. Let ln(Unit_Valuerkt) denote the natural logarithm 
of the unit value of city r’s export of product k in year t. Our speciﬁ  cation 
relates this variable to city by year ﬁ  xed eﬀects, product ﬁ  xed eﬀects, the 
share of export processing zones in a city’s export of a given product, the 
share of high-  tech zones in that city’s export of that product (distinguished 
in regressions between processing and nonprocessing exports), the share of 
processing trade in that city’s export of that product from outside any policy 
zones, and other control variables.
(6) Ln(Unit_Valuerkt)   city_year_ﬁ  xed   product_ﬁ  xed 
     1 EPZ_sharerkt 
     2 High_tech_zone_Processing_Sharerkt
     3 Processing_trade_outside_anyzonerkt
     4 High_tech_zone_nonprocessing_sharerkt 
    other_controls    rkt
Note that city by year ﬁ  xed eﬀects are more general than either year ﬁ  xed 
eﬀects or city ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Our regression results are reported in table 2.13. 
Column (1) shows that both export processing zones and high-  tech zones 
are associated with higher unit values. Of the exports originated from the 
high-  tech zones, those produced by processing trade are linked to higher 
unit values than those of nonprocessing trade. An increase of 10 percent in 
processing exports from a high- tech zone as a share of a city’s total exports is 
associated with an increase of 5.9 percent in unit value, whereas an increase 
of the same magnitude in the share of nonprocessing trade from high-  tech 
zones is associated with a 2.1 percent increase in unit value. An increase of 10 
percent in the export share of EPZs in a city’s total exports is associated with 
an increase of 2.1 percent in unit value. With regard to unit value, there is no 
diﬀerence between exports from an export processing zone and nonprocess-
ing exports from a high-  tech zone. In comparison, an increase of 10 percent 
in the share of processing exports originating outside any policy zone is 
associated with a 1.2 percent increase in unit value. Overall, processing trade 
appears to be associated with higher-  quality varieties than ordinary trade.
To show the role of foreign investment in upgrading the quality of 
products, column (2) of table 2.13 includes the respective shares of wholly 
foreign- owned and joint- venture ﬁ  rms in a city’s total exports (by HS eight-
  digit code) as additional regressors. Both new regressors have positive and 
statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients. An increase of 10 percent in the share 
of exports made by these two types of ﬁ  rms in a city’s total exports of a 90        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
product tends to be associated with an increase in the unit value of the 
given product by 2.0 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively. This suggests that 
products from foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms—assigned higher values—are gener-
ally of higher quality.
Interestingly, this adjustment renders the share of EPZs statistically insig-
niﬁ  cant. The coeﬃcients on the shares of processing and ordinary trade 
out of high-  tech zones, and on the share of processing trade outside policy 
zones, while still positive and statistically signiﬁ  cant, are now smaller in mag-
nitude (by more than 2 standard deviations, in two out of the three cases). 
This suggests that part of the higher– unit value eﬀect, previously attributed 
to processing trade and high-  tech zones, is in fact due to the presence of 
foreign- invested  ﬁ  rms in these activities. As noted in the preceding (table 
2.4), during the sample period more than 95 percent of exports originating 
from EPZs and from processing trade in high-  tech zones were produced by 
foreign- invested  ﬁ  rms.
Table 2.13  What explains the cross-  city diﬀerence in the unit values of exports?
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Export processing zone exports as a 









Processing exports in high-  tech zones as 
  a share of total city exports
0.589∗∗ 0.429∗∗ 0.428∗∗ 0.434∗∗
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Nonprocessing exports in high-  tech 
  zones as a share of total city exports
0.206∗∗ 0.171∗∗ 0.172∗∗ 0.173∗∗
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Processing exports outside economic 
  zones as a share of total city exports
0.119∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Foreign-  investment enterprise ﬁ  rm 
 export  share
0.198∗∗ 0.179∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Joint- venture  ﬁ  rm export share 0.222∗∗ 0.207∗∗
(0.004) (0.004)
Collective and private ﬁ  rm export share –0.290∗∗ –0.094∗∗
(0.005) (0.004)
State-  owned enterprise ﬁ  rm export share –0.196∗∗
(0.004)
Product ﬁ  xed eﬀects YYYY
City year ﬁ  xed eﬀects YYYY
No. of unique cities 238 238 238 238
No. of unique products 6,473 6,473 6,473 6,473
No. of observations 1,256,999 1,256,999 1,256,999 1,256,999
Adjusted R2 0.794 0.794 0.794 0.794
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of the unit value of Harmonized System six-  digit prod-
ucts, from 1996 to 2004. The regressions include city by year ﬁ  xed eﬀects and product ﬁ  xed eﬀects. Stan-
dard errors are given in parentheses.
∗∗Signiﬁ  cant at the 5 percent level.What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    9 1
Column (3) of table 2.13 includes a regressor of the combined share of 
collective and private ﬁ  rms in a city’s total exports and one of the share 
of state-  owned ﬁ  rms (this column excludes that of shares held by foreign-
 invested  ﬁ  rms). Column (4) of table 2.13 includes the two types of foreign-
 invested ﬁ  rms plus the combined share of the collective and domestic private 
ﬁ  rms (leaving out that of state- owned ﬁ  rms). The shares of exports made by 
collective and domestic private ﬁ  rms, and by state-  owned ﬁ  rms, have nega-
tive and statistically signiﬁ  cant coeﬃcients, indicating that a larger share 
of Chinese domestic ﬁ  rms in a city’s exports is associated with a lower unit 
value of those exports. This conﬁ  rms the intuition that, in a given HS eight-
 digit product line, foreign- invested ﬁ  rms in China produce relatively higher-
  quality varieties than do Chinese domestic ﬁ  rms.
Taking these unit value results together, we conclude that processing trade 
(regardless of its origin), high-  tech zones, and foreign invested ﬁ  rms are 
all independently associated with higher unit values, suggesting that they 
have each individually played a role in leading China to produce and export 
higher-  quality products than it otherwise would have.
2.4    Conclusion
Are China’s exports competing head to head with those of high-  income 
countries? This paper addresses this question by examining variations 
in export sophistication across diﬀerent cities in China. It looks at both 
the overlap in product structure between a city’s exports and those of the 
advanced economies and at the unit values of diﬀerent products.
Estimation shows that China’s export structure as a whole has begun 
increasingly to resemble that of the G3 advanced economies, and the unit 
values of its exports are also rising over time. If these patterns are generated 
entirely by the rise of processing trade, then there may not be much genuine 
increase in the sophistication of Chinese exports. If there has been increase 
in sophistication, but one brought about solely by foreign investment in 
China, then the economic proﬁ  t associated with improved sophistication has 
accrued to foreign economies rather than to China’s. Of course, increased 
sophistication can also come from a higher level of local human capital 
or from government policies set up expressly to promote the upgrading of 
industrial infrastructure, such as government initiatives establishing high-
  tech policy zones. Regional variations in the use of processing trade and 
high- tech zones and the availability of skilled labor are assessed in this paper 
to determine the relative importance of these factors. Econometric analysis 
conducted in this study helps to clarify this issue.
1. Cross-  city diﬀerences in human capital are linked to cross-  city 
diﬀerences in the sophistication of export structure. A higher level of human 92        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
8. The higher unit values associated with processing exports may simply reﬂ  ect the higher 
cost of using imported inputs rather than domestically made inputs. This leaves open the ques-
tion of whether processing exports generate more value added than do normal exports that use 
more local or domestic inputs.
capital is associated with more sophisticated export structures in Chinese 
cities.
2.  High-  tech zones are associated both with more sophisticated export 
structures and with higher unit values. This indicates that the policy zones 
(especially ETDZs and HTIDZs) set up by central and local governments 
may have worked to induce ﬁ  rms to upgrade their product ladder to a higher 
level than they would have otherwise done. In other words, these policy zones 
not only promoted processing trade, but they also promoted improvements 
in the sophistication of China’s exports.
3.  The EPZs contribute both to the rising sophistication of China’s export 
structure and to the rising unit values of its exports. However, because only a 
tiny fraction of Chinese cities have EPZs and because most of their exports 
come from foreign- invested ﬁ  rms, EPZs do not contribute greatly to explain-
ing cross-  city diﬀerences in export sophistication.
4.  Processing trade is not generally a major factor in explaining the cross-
 city  diﬀerences in export-  structure sophistication. This can be seen in two 
ways. First, with regard to exports originating outside policy zones (which 
took up the lion’s share of China’s total exports during our sample period, 
about 42 percent), more processing trade is in fact associated with a lesser 
resemblance to the export structure of advanced countries. Second, with 
regard to exports originating inside of the high- tech zones, products associ-
ated with the processing trade do not appear to overlap more with advanced 
countries’ exports than do those associated with nonprocessing trade.
However, processing trade is signiﬁ  cantly associated with higher unit 
values. How can our ﬁ  ndings on export structure and unit values be recon-
ciled? If processing-  export production outside the policy zones is generally 
labor- intensive, a higher share in a given city will increase the dissimilarity of 
that city’s export structure to that of the G3 advanced economies. However, 
processing exports could still be of higher quality (of greater sophistication) 
than normal trade exports in the same product line if higher-  quality mate-
rials are used to manufacture the former. In other words, processing trade 
moves China into the production and export of more sophisticated varieties 
within a given product category, but not necessarily within those product 
categories heavily exported by the G3 advanced economies.8
5.  The export share of foreign-  invested ﬁ  rms in a Chinese city does not 
appear to play a major role in explaining cross- city diﬀerences in the sophis-
tication level of export structures. If anything, joint- venture ﬁ  rms may create 
some divergence between a city’s export structure and that of the advanced What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    9 3
economies. However, after controlling for processing trade, both types of 
foreign- invested ﬁ  rms are found to be strongly associated with higher export 
unit values. Therefore, foreign investment has been conducive to greater 
same-  product sophistication in China.
Appendix
Table 2A.1  Deﬁ  nition of key variables and their data sources
  Description Data sources
Dependent variable
  EDIrft   (iabs[sirft – sref\i,t]) Absolute export structure 
dissimilarity index
Calculated by the authors 
from the Harmonized 
System six-  digit level. 
Chinese city exports based 
on oﬃcial China Customs 
Statistics. Data on U.S., 
EU15, and Japanese 
exports downloaded from 
World Integrated Trade 
Solution.
Explanatory variables
  GMP Gross  metropolitan  product 
(10,000 yuan)
China city data, China Data 
Online
  GMPpcrt   100 GMPr/POPr Chinese GMP per capita 
(yuan)
China city data, China Data 
Online
  SKILLrt   100(no. of college 
    students)rt/
(nonagricultural 
population)rt
Student enrollment in 
institutions of higher 
education as a share of the 
city nonagricultural 
population
China city data, China Data 
Online
  EPZ_sharerft Export processing zone 





Processing exports in the two 
high-  tech zones as a share 




Nonprocessing exports in the 
two high-  tech zones as a 




Processing exports outside 
policy zones as a share of 
total city exports
China Customs Statistics
(continued)94        Zhi Wang and Shang-Jin Wei
  Description Data sources
  Expﬁ  eshrft Foreign- invested  enterprise 
ﬁ  rm exports as share of 
total city exports
China Customs Statistics
  Expjonshrft Joint- venture  ﬁ  rm exports as 
share of total city exports
China Customs Statistics
  expothshrft Collective and private ﬁ  rm 
exports as share of total 
city exports
China Customs Statistics
  expsoeshrft State-  owned enterprise ﬁ  rm 
exports as share of total 
city exports
China Customs Statistics
Table 2A.1  (continued)
Table 2A.2  Years of establishment of economic zones, by incentive type














1100 Beijing CY 1996 1996 2001
1200 Tianjin CY 1996 1996 2001
1301 Shijiazhuang 1996
1303 Qinhuangdao 1996 2005
1306 Baoding 1996
1401 Taiyuan 2003 1996
1502 Baotou 1997
2101 Shenyang 1996 1996
2102 Dalian 1996 1996 2001
2103 Anshan 1996
2201 Changchun 1996 1996
2202 Jilin 1996
2301 Harbin 1996 1996
2306 Daqing 1996
3100 Shanghai CY 1996 1996 2001
3201 Nanjing 1996 2004
3202 Wuxi 1997 2003
3204 Changzhou 1997
3205 Suzhou 1996 1997 2001
3206 Nantong 1996 2003
3207 Lianyungang 1996 2004
3211 Zhenjiang 2004
3301 Hangzhou 1996 1996 2001What Accounts for the Rising Sophistication of China's Exports?    9 5














3302 Ningbo 1996 2004
3303 Wenzhou 1996
3401 Hefei 2005 1996
3402 Wuhu 1996 2003
3501 Fuzhou 1996 1996
3502 Xiamen 1995 1996 2002
3601 Nanchang 1996
3701 Jinan 1996
3702 Qingdao 1996 1997 2004
3703 Zibo 1999
3706 Yantai 1996 2001
3707 Weifang 1996
3710 Weihai 1996 2001
4101 Zhengzhou 1996 2005
4103 Luoyang 1997




4401 Guangzhou 1996 1996 2001
4403 Shenzhen 1995 1996 2002









4601 Haikou 1995 1996
4602 Sanya 1995
5000 Chongqing 2002 2002 2002









6501 Urumqi 1996 1997
Note: Cities that did not have any policy zone between 1996 and 2005 are not listed.
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Table 2A.4  Harmonized System (HS) products excluded from export data
HS code Description HS code Description
01–24 Agricultural products 25–27 Mineral products
4103 Other raw hides and skins (fresh, o 8002 Tin waste and scrap
4104 Tanned or crust hides and skins of 8101 Tungsten (wolfram) and articles 
the
4105 Tanned or crust skins of sheep or 1 8102 Molybdenum and articles thereof, in
4106 Tanned or crust hides and skins of 8103 Tantalum and articles thereof, incl
4402 Wood charcoal (including shell or n 8104 Magnesium and articles thereof, inc
4403 Wood in the rough, whether or not s 8105 Cobalt mattes and other 
intermediate
7201 Pig iron and spiegeleisen in pigs, 8106 Bismuth and articles thereof, inclu
7202 Ferro- alloys 8107 Cadmium and articles thereof, inclu
7204 Ferrous waste and scrap; remelting 8108 Titanium and articles thereof, incl
7404 Copper waste and scrap 8109 Zirconium and articles thereof, inc
7501 Nickel mattes, nickel oxide sinters 8110 Antimony and articles thereof, incl
7502 Unwrought nickel 8111 Manganese and articles thereof, inc
7503 Nickel waste and scrap 8112 Beryllium, chromium, germanium, 
van
7601 Unwrought aluminium 8113 Cermets and articles thereof, inclu
7602 Aluminium waste and scrap 9701 Paintings, drawings and pastels, ex
7801 Unwrought lead 9702 Original engravings, prints and lit
7802 Lead waste and scrap 9703 Original sculptures and statuary, i
7901 Unwrought zinc 9704 Postage or revenue stamps, stamp- po
7902 Zinc waste and scrap 9705 Collections and collectors’ pieces
8001 Unwrought tin 9706 Antiques of an age exceeding 100 
years
530521 Coconut, abaca (Manila hemp or 
Musa
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Comment  Galina Hale
Zhi Wang and Shang-  Jin Wei present us with a thorough and convincing 
study of the growing sophistication of Chinese exports in recent years and 
of the forces behind this trend. We learn that improvements in human capital 
and tax incentives for high-  tech zones are responsible for the expansion 